WATTS, J.

This appeal arises from the grant of a motion to transfer by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and of summary judgment by the Circuit Court for Talbot County in favor of appellees, TransCare Maryland, Inc. and TransCare, Inc.,1 against appellants, Karen Murray and Bryson Murray.2 Karen filed a negligence/medical malpractice action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on behalf of her minor child, Bryson, for injuries sustained by Bryson during a medical aircraft transfer, and on her own behalf, a claim for loss of parental relationship and extraordinary costs and expenses. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted appellees' motion to transfer to the Circuit Court for Talbot County on the grounds of forum non conveniens, where summary judgment was granted in favor of appellees. Appellants raise three issues on appeal, which we quote as follows:

We answer the first question in the negative and the second and third questions in the affirmative. As such, we affirm the Circuit Court for Baltimore City's grant of the motion to transfer and reverse the Circuit Court for Talbot County's grant of summary judgment and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2007, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Karen brought Bryson to the Memorial Hospital at Easton ("Easton Memorial") Emergency Department in Talbot County with complaints of congestion and trouble breathing. An evaluation in the Emergency Department revealed that Bryson had tachycardia, bilateral rhonchi, and diffuse wheezing. Due to the degree of Bryson's respiratory distress, and as a precaution, at 7:35 p.m. Easton Memorial medical personnel electively intubated Bryson. After the intubation, a decision was made to transfer Bryson to University of Maryland Medical System's ("UMMS") Pediatric Intensive Care Unit via helicopter, as Easton Memorial was unable to manage intubated children. UMMS contacted PHI Air Medical in order to effectuate the transfer. PHI Air Medical dispatched a helicopter and a pediatric transport team to Easton Memorial, consisting of several individuals, including a UMMS pediatric nurse and appellees' employee, Chris Barbour. Barbour was employed by appellees as a paramedic. In appellee's memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment, they stated that: "Barbour was a paramedic licensed by the State of Maryland to provide medical care at the time of the incident—although he was still in paramedic orientation."4

On November 16, 2007, at approximately 1:25 a.m., Bryson was placed on the helicopter for transport. Appellants allege that during transport, Bryson's airway became blocked by his endotracheal tube and he failed to receive sufficient oxygen. The transport team searched for a pediatric mask to deliver oxygen to Bryson, but were unable to locate the mask. As a result, the pilot landed at Bay Bridge Airport and located the mask for the transport team. Appellants contend that the oxygen mask was located too late and a lack of oxygen caused Bryson to suffer permanent brain damage.

In the memorandum in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, appellees describe themselves as a "ground ambulance company." On November 9, 2009, Barbour testified in a deposition that appellee, TransCare Maryland, Inc. is "[a] private ambulance company." At the time of Bryson's transfer, appellee, TransCare Maryland, Inc., held licenses to operate as an Advanced Life Support Commercial Ambulance Service, Basic Life Support Commercial Ambulance Service, and Neonatal Life Support Commercial Ambulance Service.5 It is undisputed that appellees did not own or operate the helicopter that transferred Bryson and, with the exception of Barbour, did not employ any of the personnel who took part in Bryson's medical aircraft transfer.

Appellees contract with UMMS to provide ground ambulance transport services. PHI Air Medical, a separate company, provides UMMS with air medical transport services. According to Theresa Drayer, the manager of Maryland ExpressCare, a part of UMMS, the contract between UMMS and each transportation provider is different. For ground ambulance transport services, UMMS has a contract with appellees under which UMMS pays appellees a monthly fee to provide ground equipment and personnel. For air medical transport services, UMMS has a contract with PHI Air Medical whereby PHI Air Medical provides air equipment and personnel at its own expense and without any fee or other payment from UMMS.

On February 6, 2009, appellants filed a two-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging: (1) negligence/medical malpractice and (2) loss of parental relationship and extraordinary costs and expenses against appellees. In the negligence/medical malpractice count, appellants sued appellees individually "and/or through [their] actual and/or apparent agents, representatives, and/or employee, Mr. Barb[our.]" Appellants alleged that appellees, individually and/or through Barbour, were negligent because, during Bryson's transfer, Barbour failed to follow the requisite standard of care for paramedics. In the Complaint, appellants allege that Barbour failed to provide adequate care to Bryson by failing "to remove the misplaced endotracheal tube and initiate masked ventilation or mouth-to-mouth breathing or intubation as appropriate," and by failing to promptly locate the oxygen mask. Appellants did not bring action against Barbour individually.

On March 27, 2009, appellees filed a Motion to Transfer to the Circuit Court for Talbot County on the grounds of forum non conveniens. On April 8, 2009, appellants filed an Opposition to the Motion to Transfer. On April 15, 2009, appellees filed a Reply. On May 29, 2009, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City conducted a hearing on the Motion to Transfer. During the hearing, as to appellants' choice of forum, the circuit court stated:

The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the Motion to Transfer to Talbot County, ruling orally from the bench as follows:

On the same day, the circuit court issued an Order consistent with the oral ruling.

On July 16, 2010, appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the Circuit Court for Talbot County. In the memorandum supporting the motion, appellees contended that Bryson's negligence/medical malpractice claim is precluded by the Good Samaritan Act6 and the Fire and Rescue Act.7 Appellees contended that Karen's claim for loss of parental relationship is not recognized by Maryland law and sought to have the claim dismissed as a matter of law. On August 2, 2010, appellants filed an Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire and Rescue Act are inapplicable to the circumstances of the case. In the Opposition, Karen withdrew the loss of parental relationship claim, but not the claim for extraordinary costs. On August 5, 2010, appellees filed a Reply to the Opposition.

On August 9, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The circuit court denied the motion for summary judgment, ruling orally from the bench as follows:

On August 19, 2010, appellees filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 7, 2010, appellants filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. On September 16, 2010, appellees filed a Reply to appellants' Opposition.

On September 23, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on appellees' Motion for Reconsideration. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court granted the Motion for Reconsideration, ruling orally from the bench as follows:

Consistent with the oral ruling, on September 23, 2010, the circuit court issued an Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration and summary judgment in favor of appellees. On October 8, 2010, appellants noted this appeal.

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellants contend that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City abused its discretion in transferring the action to the Circuit Court for Talbot County on the grounds of forum non conveniens because: (1) the circuit court failed to give "proper regard" to appellants' choice of forum and (2) the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice weighed strongly in favor of denying the motion to transfer. Appellants maintain that the circuit court abused its discretion by giving only "some deference" to appellants' choice of forum, and that in doing so, the circuit court "misapplied" case law that requires the court to give "proper regard" to appellants' choice of forum. Appellants acknowledge that a plaintiff's choice of forum has "minimal value" in a court's determination as to transfer of an action where the plaintiff is not a resident of the chosen forum, but contend that "this principle loses its force" when the defendants, such as appellees, are also not residents of the chosen forum.

Appellants contend that the circuit court improperly weighed the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice factors. As to the convenience of the parties and witnesses, appellants argue that: (1) the circuit court improperly determined that the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of transferring the action, as there is no evidence that appellees reside, carry on regular business, are employed, or habitually engage in a vocation in Talbot County; (2) the circuit court failed "to give any weight to the convenience of the expert witnesses;" and (3) the circuit court improperly determined that the convenience of non-expert witnesses weighed in favor of granting the motion to transfer despite the fact that key witnesses are located in Baltimore City, such as the transport team, Bryson's treating physicians at UMMS, Johns Hopkins, and Kennedy Krieger, and Barbour, who works at UMMS.

As to the private interest factors, appellants maintain that this is a "complex medical malpractice case" and that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City is better equipped than the Circuit Court for Talbot County to handle a lengthy complex case with numerous expert and fact witnesses. As to the public interest factors, appellants contend that those factors weighed strongly in favor of denial of the motion to transfer. Appellants assert that Baltimore City has a "significant local interest" in adjudication of the actions because: (1) providing safe medical transport is a significant interest to "every citizen in the state of Maryland, including Baltimore City;" (2) Bryson was transported to UMMS in Baltimore City, pursuant to a contract between UMMS and the air transport company; (3) the transport team came from UMMS in Baltimore City; and (4) UMMS, Johns Hopkins Hospital, and Kennedy Krieger Institute, all located in Baltimore City, provided the majority of Bryson's care.

Appellees respond that application of the legal standards for granting transfer on the grounds of forum non conveniens to the facts of the case confirms that the circuit court properly granted the motion for transfer. Appellees argue that a plaintiff's choice of forum "is not an absolute and uncontrolled privilege that is determinative under present forum non conveniens law," and that the choice has minimal value, in a case such as this, where appellants are not residents of the forum in which they bring the action. Appellees contend that the "overall convenience of the parties and witnesses to this action was best served through transfer of the action to the Circuit Court for Talbot County." Appellees argue that appellants are residents of Talbot County, and that healthcare providers and witnesses to Bryson's care and treatment at Easton Memorial, located in Talbot County, are also likely residents of Talbot County, thereby making it "at least as convenient . . . to travel to the courthouse as it [is] to travel to work."

Appellees maintain that the circuit court properly determined that private interest factors, such as ensuring ease of access to evidence, the availability of compulsory process, the cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses, and "other practical considerations" weighed in favor of the transfer. As to public interest factors, appellees contend that because the action involves matters unrelated to the citizens of Baltimore City but of local interest to the community in Talbot County, the circuit court correctly determined that the public interest factors of court congestion and the burden of jury duty on the community weighed in favor of transferring the case to Talbot County. Specifically, appellees maintain that "[t]he acts or omissions at issue in treating a resident of Talbot County, while still in Talbot County, neither affect the community members of Baltimore City nor warrant the imposition of jury duty on the residents of Baltimore City." Appellees argue that based on the circuit court's consideration of all of the factors and reasoned analysis, "it cannot be said that no reasonable court would [have found] that transfer of venue was warranted." Simply put, we agree.

Maryland Rule 2-327(c) states that "[o]n motion of any party, the court may transfer any action to any other circuit court where the action might have been brought if the transfer is for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and serves the interests of justice." In reviewing a grant of a motion to transfer under Md. Rule 2-327(c), we review the circuit court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Stidham v. Morris, 161 Md.App. 562, 566, 870 A.2d 1285 (2005). "An abuse of discretion is said to occur where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Accordingly, when reviewing a motion to transfer, a reviewing court should be reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court." Cobrand v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 149 Md.App. 431, 437, 816 A.2d 117 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Upon review:

Payton-Henderson v. Evans, 180 Md.App. 267, 286, 949 A.2d 654 (2008) (emphasis in original) (quoting Cobrand, 149 Md.App. at 445, 816 A.2d 117). Because "we may not have chosen to transfer th[e] case," does not mean that a trial judge abused his or her discretion because "we should [not] simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court." Urquhart v. Simmons, 339 Md. 1, 19, 660 A.2d 412 (1995).

Plaintiff's Choice of Forum

A court's discretion in transferring an action is not unlimited. Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 567, 870 A.2d 1285. A plaintiff's choice of forum must be given "proper regard," and the plaintiff's choice will not be "altered solely because it is more convenient for the moving party to be in another forum." Leung v. Nunes, 354 Md. 217, 224, 729 A.2d 956 (1999) (citations and quotations omitted). Nonetheless, the plaintiff's choice of forum is not dispositive and "less deference should be accorded" to a plaintiff's choice when the plaintiff is not a resident of the forum or when the choice of forum has "no meaningful ties to the controversy and no particular interest in the parties or subject matter." Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 569, 870 A.2d 1285 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Nodeen v. Sigurdsson, 408 Md. 167, 968 A.2d 1075 (2009) (The Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court for Calvert County erred in granting of motion to transfer venue to Anne Arundel County, when the plaintiff resided in Calvert County, stating: "When `at best, the balancing of factors produce an equipoise, the plaintiff['s] choice of forum controls.'").

Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses

A motion to transfer may only be granted when the balance between two factors—convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice—weigh strongly in favor of the moving party. Odenton Dev. Co. v. Lamy, 320 Md. 33, 40, 575 A.2d 1235 (1990) (citations omitted). The party who moves to transfer an action under Md. Rule 2-327(c) has the burden of proving that transferring the action is more convenient and better serves the interests of justice. Id. (citations omitted). The convenience factor consists of the convenience of the parties and witnesses. Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 568, 870 A.2d 1285. In Payton-Henderson, 180 Md.App. at 289-91, 949 A.2d 654, this Court's review of the convenience of the parties and non-expert witnesses centered around where the parties and witnesses lived and worked in relation to the court. As to expert witnesses, however, this Court has given little weight to their convenience. Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 169 Md.App. 286, 302, 900 A.2d 301 (2006) (We provided that a plaintiff's "allegation about his possible expert is entitled to some weight, but not much.").

Private and Public Interests of Justice

The interests of justice factor requires a court to weigh both private and public interests. Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 568, 870 A.2d 1285 (citations omitted). Private interests of justice "concern[] the efficacy of the trial process itself. It is deemed a `private interest' because it is concerned only with a particular case." Payton-Henderson, 180 Md.App. at 292, 949 A.2d 654. We have stated that private interests of justice include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (4) possibility of view of premises (the subject of the action or where the incident occurred), if view would be appropriate to the action; and (5) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 568, 870 A.2d 1285 (citations omitted). Public interests of justice, on the other hand, "embrace[] such broad citizen concerns as the county's road system, its educational system, its governmental integrity, its police protection, its crime problem, its fire protection, etc." Payton-Henderson, 180 Md.App. at 293, 949 A.2d 654. Public interests of justice include: (1) considerations of court congestion; (2) the burden of jury duty; and (3) local interest in the matter at hand. Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 569, 870 A.2d 1285 (citations omitted).

Analysis

Returning to the case at hand, appellants chose a forum, Baltimore City, in which neither appellants nor appellees reside.8 Although the circuit court was required to give "proper regard" to appellants' choice of forum, it correctly gave less deference to the chosen forum as appellants reside in Talbot County—the eventual county of transfer—not Baltimore City. The record reflects that during the hearing on the Motion to Transfer, the circuit court stated: "What's the connection to Baltimore City? I mean I understand that I am suppose[d] to give some deference to [appellants'] choice of forum. But if [appellants] themselves . . . reside[] in Talbot County, that kind of goes to the lower end of my analysis with regard to giving [them] that deference."9 This statement demonstrates that the circuit court weighed and considered appellants' choice. As we have previously noted, "the exercise of a judge's discretion is presumed to be correct . . . [and] a trial judge's failure to state each and every consideration or factor . . . does not, absent more, constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion." Payton-Henderson, 180 Md.App. at 286, 949 A.2d 654 (internal quotations, citation, and emphasis omitted). We see no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's consideration of appellants' choice of forum.

Upon review of the circuit court's ruling on the motion to transfer, we conclude that the circuit court properly evaluated the motion under the forum non conveniens factors—convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice. When evaluating the convenience of the parties, the circuit court noted that appellants "live in Talbot County." Appellees' principal place of business is not in either Baltimore City or Talbot County. As to expert witnesses, the circuit court stated that "experts choose to get into these cases. I'm not too concerned with that." The circuit court's finding on the matter of expert witnesses was not an abuse of discretion in light of our previous holding that little weight is to be accorded to the convenience of expert witnesses. Smith, 169 Md.App. at 302, 900 A.2d 301 (A plaintiff's "allegation about his possible expert is entitled to some weight, but not much."). As to non-expert witnesses, the circuit court stated that "[k]ey witnesses are located in Talbot County." Although the non-expert witnesses were not specifically listed or identified by the circuit court in its oral ruling, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that residents of Talbot County would be called to testify at trial, including doctors and nurses from Easton Memorial who treated Bryson, and appellants themselves. As such, the record demonstrates the circuit court considered the convenience of the parties and witnesses and determined that this was a factor that weighed in favor of transfer.

Insofar as the interests of justice are concerned, the circuit court properly weighed and considered the public and private interest factors and found them to weigh in favor of granting the Motion to Transfer to Talbot County. As to the private interest factors, the circuit court observed that ease of access to sources of proof was not an issue as medical records, whether located in Talbot County or Baltimore City, are easily transported. Although there were no premises to be viewed, the circuit court stated that "the alleged occurrence occurred in Talbot County" and that "[s]oon after takeoff in Talbot County, onset of injuries occurred a few minutes after the [aircraft[']s departure from Easton Memorial Hospital in Talbot County." Thus, the circuit court was persuaded that the private interests of justice inherent to the specific case weighed in favor of transfer to Talbot County. As we stated in Stidham, "[t]here is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." 161 Md.App. at 571, 870 A.2d 1285 (quotations and citation omitted). We perceive no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's analysis of the private interest factors.

As to the public interest factors, or those factors of general concern to the community, the circuit court stated:

The circuit court's ruling demonstrates that the court considered most, if not all, of the public interests of justice factors outlined by this Court in Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 569, 870 A.2d 1285, including "court congestion, the burden of jury duty, and local interest in the matter" at hand. In Payton-Henderson, 180 Md.App. at 272-73, 294, 949 A.2d 654, we found no error in the determination by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that there was a high degree of local interest in the case in Baltimore County, which warranted transfer of the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens. We stated:

Id. at 294, 949 A.2d 654. A similar rationale is applicable in this case. Talbot County has a significant local interest in the case because Bryson, a Talbot County resident, was taken to a hospital in Talbot County and intubated there. As discussed above, the circuit court noted the injury "occurred in Talbot County," starting in Easton Memorial and continuing into transport in the aircraft over Talbot County. Appellants brought this action as a result of injury occurring before Bryson's arrival in Baltimore City.10 As such, the component of local interest in the matter as both a private and public interest factor weighed strongly in favor of transfer. The circuit court considered factors such as imposition on the court's docket and jury pool and determined that there was "minimal connection to . . . Baltimore City, that would [] warrant an imposition on not only a congested docket, but a jury pool from Baltimore City." In Payton-Henderson, 180 Md.App. at 293, 949 A.2d 654, we determined that the circuit court, utilizing the same grounds, gave proper weight to the public interest consideration for transfer of the case to Baltimore County. For all of the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the circuit court properly weighed the factors applicable in a forum non conveniens review, and properly exercised its discretion in granting the motion to transfer because the case "had minimal at best connection to Baltimore City."

II.

Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees because the Good Samaritan Act, CJP § 5-603, does not apply to private commercial ambulance companies and, therefore, appellees are not immune under the Act. Appellants maintain that the legislative history of the Good Samaritan Act demonstrates that "it has never been amended to include a private, for-profit ambulance company[]" and that the General Assembly did not intend to provide immunity to "a private, for-profit ambulance company[]" like appellees. Appellants argue that the Good Samaritan Act "does not require the patient to be charged a fee" for services rendered and "does not indicate that `fee and/or other compensation' is specifically limited to payment or compensation directly from the patient." Appellants contend that appellees "did in fact receive or had the legal right to receive a fee or compensation for the time that Mr. Barbour provided assistance or medical care to Bryson[,]" and that appellees cannot evade liability by choosing not to bill a patient. Appellants argue that appellees do, "in fact bill patients. . . contractually through UMMS."

Appellees respond that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment under the Good Samaritan Act in their favor. Appellees argue that the Act "applies to any individual licensed by the State to provide medical care[,]" and that the Act covers Barbour, who was a licensed paramedic member of an ambulance squad at the time of the incident. Appellees contend that because Barbour, their employee, is immune under the Act, they also are immune. Appellees maintain that the "`for-profit' status of a medical care provider or entity does not create a blanket prohibition on the application of the Good Samaritan statute." Appellees contend that they meet the three basic requirements of the Good Samaritan Act, in that: (1) there was no act or omission of gross negligence; (2) the act or assistance was provided without fee or other compensation; and (3) the assistance or medical care was provided in transit to a medical facility. Appellees argue they are, therefore, afforded immunity under the Act's application. As to the second requirement, of no fee or other compensation, appellees contend that they "billed in accordance with the usual practices of all entities involved[,]" and that they (appellees) did not receive compensation through their contract with UMMS barring application of the Good Samaritan Act.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Md. Rule 2-501(f), we review the circuit court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo. Bonfiglio v. Fitzgerald, 197 Md.App. 327, 337 (2011) (citations omitted). Our review is "two-fold," in that we determine first, whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact, and second, whether the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In determining whether a material fact is in dispute, a trial court must give great deference to the non-moving party as well as review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lipscomb v. Hess, 255 Md. 109, 118, 257 A.2d 178 (1969) (citations omitted).

Interpretation of the Good Samaritan Act by Maryland appellate courts has been limited; as such, we are guided by the principles of statutory interpretation. "The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature. In that task, we must `look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.'" Montgomery County v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 60, 31 A.3d 191 (2011) (internal citations omitted). In Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., 414 Md. 215, 227-28, 994 A.2d 968 (2010), the Court of Appeals recently stated that:

(Citing Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274-76, 987 A.2d 18 (2010)). As recently explained by Judge Mary Ellen Barbera, in DeWolfe v. Richmond, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, 2012 WL 10853, No. 34, September Term 2011, Slip op. at 28 (filed January 4, 2012):

(Citations omitted).

(1) Plain Language

The issue in this case is whether appellees are protected from civil liability under the Good Samaritan Act and, as a result, are entitled to summary judgment. The Good Samaritan Act, codified at CJP § 5-603 and titled "Emergency medical care," provides immunity to a broad class of rescuers and medical providers for any act or omission in giving assistance or medical care provided without fee or other compensation, unless grossly negligent, (1) at the scene of an emergency, (2) in transit to a medical facility, or (3) through communications with personnel providing emergency assistance. Specifically, CJP § 5-603 provides as follows:

(Emphasis added). The Act does not provide a definition of "person," "individual," or "member." A review of the plain meaning of those terms, however, supports the conclusion a private commercial ambulance company, is not covered by those terms, and, therefore, is not immune by application of the Act. Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (8th ed. 1999), defines "person" as: "A human being.—Also termed natural person." See also Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 924 (11th ed. 2003) ("Person" is defined as "human, individual.") "Individual" is defined as: "1. Existing as an indivisible entity. 2. Of or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group." Black's Law Dictionary 789 (8th ed. 1999). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 635 (11th ed. 2003) defines "individual" as follows: "a particular being or thing as distinguished from a class, species, or collection as (1): a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." "Member" is defined as "one of the individuals composing a group." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 774 (11th ed. 2003).

Through the plain meaning of its terms, the Good Samaritan Act, with the exceptions outlined in (b)(3) and (b)(4), is applicable solely to individual persons—not companies or corporations such as appellees—who render aid meeting the requirements set forth in subsection (a).11 Appellants did not sue Barbour individually as a "person" and Barbour is not an appellee in the case. Whether or not Barbour would be immune under subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), or (c) is irrelevant for purposes of our analysis.

Assuming arguendo that Barbour is immune under the Act, appellees do not, as they argue, automatically become immune under the Act via Barbour's immunity. In order for a company or corporate entity to enjoy the immunity provided under the Good Samaritan Act, that company or corporate entity must qualify under either (b)(3) or (b)(4). Subsection (b)(3) clearly applies to volunteer fire departments or ambulance and rescue squads whose members have immunity, and subsection (b)(4) applies only to a corporation when its fire department personnel are immune under (b)(2). Subsection (b)(3) is clearly inapplicable as it is undisputed that appellee, TransCare Maryland Inc., is a private commercial ambulance company, and not a volunteer ambulance squad. Subsection (b)(4) is inapplicable as well as appellees have not contended that they maintain, or are, a fire department, or that Barbour was employed as "fire department personnel."

In their brief, appellees expressly acknowledge that the Good Samaritan Act "applies to any individual licensed by the State to provide medical care." (Emphasis added). Appellees wrongly conclude, however, that because Barbour could be immune under the Act, they too are immune. That simply is not the case; when the General Assembly wishes to provide immunity to companies or corporations, it is capable of doing so and has done so. For example, the Fire and Rescue Act, codified at CJP § 5-604, clearly provides immunity to "a fire company or rescue company, and the personnel of a fire company or rescue company." (Emphasis added). For all of the reasons stated above, we conclude that under a plain language analysis, CJP § 5-603 does not provide immunity to private commercial ambulance companies that are not "persons," "individuals," or "members" under the Act.

(2) Legislative History

In Tatum v. Gigliotti, 80 Md.App. 559, 566-67, 565 A.2d 354 (1989), aff'd, 321 Md. 623, 583 A.2d 1062 (1991), Judge Paul E. Alpert, speaking for this Court, discussed the relevant legislative history of the Good Samaritan Act as follows:

In 1982, in House Bill 523, Chapter 770, § 4, the General Assembly amended § 132 of Article 43, and recodified the Good Samaritan Act at CJP § 5-309. In 1982, CJP § 5-309 provided as follows:

The General Assembly stated the purpose of the amendment as follows:

(Emphasis added).

In 1982, in House Bill 1872, Chapter 775, the General Assembly amended subsection (b) of CJP § 5-309 as follows:

The General Assembly stated the amendment was "FOR the purpose of providing immunity from civil liability for certain corporations and certain fire department personnel rendering aid under certain conditions[.]" (Emphasis added). The addition of CJP § 5-309(b)(4) extended immunity from civil liability to certain corporations providing support or sponsoring an in-house fire department when the department assists at an off-site emergency.12

In 1983, in House Bill 851, Chapter 248, CJP § 5-309 was amended "FOR the purpose of providing that certain paramedical personnel are not civilly liable for giving assistance under certain circumstances[.]" In 1983, the General Assembly added the following language to CJP § 5-309(b)(2)(iii): "(iii) Is certified or licensed by this State as an emergency medical technician, [or] cardiac rescue technician, OR EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIAN-PARAMEDIC[.]"

The "Editor's Note[s]" of CJP § 5-603 provide that:

(Emphasis added).13

Nothing in the legislative history demonstrates an intent by the General Assembly to extend immunity to private commercial ambulance companies. In fact, the legislative history specifically demonstrates the General Assembly's intent to extend immunity to certain persons and corporations, but not private commercial ambulance companies.14 As stated above, in 1982, in House Bill 1872, Chapter 775, the General Assembly carved out two types of corporate entities for which immunity would be provided—(1) "A volunteer fire department, ambulance and rescue squad whose members have immunity" and (2) "A corporation when its fire department personnel are immune under paragraph (2) of this subsection." At no point did the General Assembly seek to include private commercial ambulance companies or corporations. A review of the legislative history clearly demonstrates that the Good Samaritan Act does not provide immunity to private commercial ambulance companies.

(3) Relevant Case Law

Relevant case law supports the conclusion that private commercial ambulance companies are not protected from civil liability under the Good Samaritan Act. The few cases addressing applicability of the Good Samaritan Act demonstrate that the Act applies to persons, not corporate entities like appellees. In Tatum, 80 Md.App. at 562, 565 A.2d 354, this Court held that a "salaried emergency medical technician" of the Prince George's County Fire Department was immune under the Good Samaritan Act. In McCoy v. Hatmaker, 135 Md.App. 693, 705, 763 A.2d 1233 (2000), we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of an ambulance paramedic employed by Baltimore City and a Baltimore City police officer on the basis of the Good Samaritan Act "because Maryland law affords them immunity from civil damages in the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct." We know of no reported Maryland appellate authority extending immunity to a private commercial ambulance company, or to any company or corporation, under the Good Samaritan Act.

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the Good Samaritan Act does not apply to private commercial ambulance companies. As such, we need not address the parties' other contentions as to the Act's applicability.

III.

Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in granting appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment as appellees are neither a fire nor a rescue company as described in the Fire and Rescue Act, CJP § 5-604. Appellants argue that CJP § 5-604 is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case given the plain and obvious meaning of the statutory language. Appellants contend that the legislative history of CJP § 5-604 demonstrates that the statute is inapplicable because the General Assembly intended CJP § 5-604 to protect fire departments, not private commercial ambulance companies, such as appellees, acting in a situation that did not involve a rescue or an emergency.

Appellees respond that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in their favor on the ground that they are immune from civil liability as a "rescue company" under CJP § 5-604. Appellees contend that all of the factors contained in CJP § 5-604 necessary to establish immunity are satisfied, as there was no willful or grossly negligent act, TransCare Maryland, Inc. is a rescue company, and the act or omission occurred in the course of TransCare Maryland, Inc. performing its duties. Specifically, as to the second factor of CJP § 5-604, appellees contend that an ambulance company satisfies the definition of a rescue company for purposes of CJP § 5-604, and that whether or not the ambulance company acts for profit is irrelevant.15 Upon review of the plain language of CJP § 5-604, its legislative history, and relevant statutes and case law, we disagree.

(1) Plain Language

The issue in this case is whether appellees are protected from civil liability under CJP § 5-604, titled "Fire and rescue companies," and, as a result, are entitled to summary judgment. CJP § 5-604 contains no definition of the term "rescue company" and Maryland appellate courts have not addressed the issue.16

CJP § 5-604 provides immunity from civil liability to members of fire and rescue companies and to the companies themselves for any act or omission performed in the course of their duties, unless the act or omission is willful or grossly negligent. CJP § 5-604 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A review of the plain meaning of the terms within CJP § 5-604 supports the conclusion that a private commercial ambulance company does not satisfy the definition of the term "rescue company." Black's Law Dictionary 1333 (8th ed. 1999), defines "rescue" as: "The act or an instance of saving or freeing someone from danger or captivity." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1059 (11th ed. 2003), defines "rescue" as follows:

An ambulance is defined as "a vehicle equipped for transporting the injured or sick." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 39 (11th ed. 2003). To conclude that an ambulance company by definition is a "rescue company" would distort the plain meaning of the words.

To the extent appellees contend that under CJP § 5-604 no distinction is made between volunteer and for-profit or public and private rescue companies, they are correct. The statute, by its plain language, does not exempt private or commercial rescue companies from immunity. The requirement, however, is that the entity in question be a fire or rescue company. A private commercial ambulance company, or any company that is not a rescue or fire company is not afforded immunity under the plain language of the statute.

Although the question arises as to whether an ambulance company performing the duties of a rescue company is afforded immunity, we need not answer this question. The statute does not by its plain meaning provide immunity to any company or entity performing rescue duties. The statute requires both—that the company be a fire or rescue company and that the alleged acts or omissions be in the course of the company or their personnel performing their official duties. Thus, it is not necessary that we determine whether appellees were performing the duties of a rescue company.17 It is enough to conclude, for all of the reasons above, that under a plain language analysis, CJP § 5-604 does not provide immunity to a private commercial ambulance company that is neither a fire nor rescue company.

(2) Legislative History

In 1964, Subsection (a) of Health Article, 43 § 149A of the Maryland Annotated Code (1957/1965 Repl.Vol.) titled "Liability for civil damages of physicians, nurses and members of volunteer ambulance and rescue squads," provided:

In 1964, in Senate Bill 43, Chapter 48, the Senate proposed amending Md. Ann. Code, Health 43 § 149A (1957/1965 Repl. Vol.) to include the following subsection:

The Senate explained the purpose of the amendment as follows:

Pursuant to Senate Bill 43, Chapter 48, the act took effect June 1, 1964.18

In 1983, in Senate Bill 731, Chapter 546, the Senate proposed amending CJP § 5-309.1 (1980 Repl. Vol/1982 Supp.).19 The purpose of the amendment was stated as follows:

(Alteration in original). Pursuant to Senate Bill 731, Chapter 546, the act was to take effect July 1, 1983. CJP § 5-309.1 was amended by Senate Bill 731, Chapter 546, in pertinent part, as follows:

(Alterations in original).

The File of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on Senate Bill 731 of the 1983 Session of the General Assembly contains a report titled "Part II: Summary of Committee Report," which states as follows:

LEGISLATIVE INTENT:

The File of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on Senate Bill 731 of the 1983 Session of the General Assembly also specifically provided that the statute be amended, in pertinent part, by striking the word "Volunteer," and after "Fire" inserting the words "and Rescue."21

In Chase, 360 Md. at 126, 756 A.2d 987, the Court of Appeals discussed the legislative history of CJP § 5-604. The Court interpreted CJP § 5-604 as follows:

(Some internal citations omitted).

In Chase, 360 Md. at 132-33, 756 A.2d 987, the Court of Appeals addressed immunity for individuals under CJP § 5-604 and stated as follows:

Although the legislative history of CJP § 5-604 and the broad focus of its clear and unambiguous language supports the proposition that the statute is applicable to fire and rescue companies regardless of whether they are volunteer, municipal, or for profit, nothing in the legislative history demonstrates an intent to extend immunity to private commercial ambulance companies.

(3) Relevant Statutes and Case Law

Relevant statutes and case law support the conclusion that a private commercial ambulance company is not protected from civil liability under CJP § 5-604. As noted above, CJP § 5-604 contains no definition of the term "rescue company," however, provisions of the Maryland Code and the Code of Maryland Regulations ("COMAR") provide distinct definitions for "commercial ambulance companies" and "fire and rescue companies" in different contexts. We shall look to these statutes and regulations for guidance. COMAR 11.17.20.02(B)(6),22 defines "fire and rescue organization" as "a Maryland fire department, rescue squad, emergency medical services unit, or volunteer fire company that is authorized to operate emergency vehicles for fire and rescue purposes."

Md.Code Ann., Ed. Art. § 13-515,23 entitled "Ambulance Service" provides that the term: "`Ambulance services' does not include the transporting of individuals in an ambulance owned, operated, or under the jurisdiction of a unit of State government, a political subdivision of the State, of a volunteer fire company or volunteer rescue squad."

COMAR 30.09.01.02(B)(13)24 provides that:

These definitions demonstrate that a commercial ambulance company has not been defined in the Maryland Code or COMAR as a fire or rescue company, and lead us to conclude that a commercial ambulance company is not a fire or rescue company under CJP § 5-604.

Md.Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 8-10225 provides that State money can be used for "fire or rescue equipment, including ambulances[,]" thereby indicating that an ambulance may be considered fire or rescue equipment for the allocation of State funds. Id. This statute does not address the issue of whether a private commercial ambulance company is a fire and rescue company under CJP § 5-604. The statute merely permits State money to be used for rescue or fire equipment, including ambulances. Sound logic dictates that because the General Assembly deemed it necessary to specify the provision of State money for ambulances, the General Assembly was aware that ambulances are not encompassed by the definition of fire and rescue equipment.

We discern no support in relevant case law or statutes for the proposition that a private commercial ambulance company is a fire or rescue company. In McCoy, 135 Md.App. at 705, 763 A.2d 1233, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including an ambulance paramedic employed by Baltimore City, holding that "Maryland law afford[ed] them immunity from civil damages in the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct." We concluded that Maryland law—through the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire and Rescue Company Act-provides immunity to "fire, rescue, and law enforcement personnel from civil damages for errors and omissions made while acting in the scope of their duties." Id. In McCoy, 135 Md.App. at 701, 763 A.2d 1233, Hatmaker, a Baltimore City ambulance paramedic, responded to a call to provide emergency assistance to McCoy, whom he concluded was dead and not a viable candidate for resuscitation. McCoy's widow brought suit alleging that Hatmaker was grossly negligent and therefore not immune under CJP § 5-603 or CJP § 5-604. McCoy, 135 Md.App. at 703-04, 763 A.2d 1233. In reviewing Hatmaker's immunity under the Fire and Rescue Company Act, we concluded that the Act "ensures that members of fire and rescue companies, like Hatmaker, `are immune from civil liability for any act or omission in the course of performing their duties,' except for those acts that are willful or grossly negligent." McCoy, 135 Md.App. at 705, 763 A.2d 1233 (quoting CJP § 5-604(a)). The issue before this Court was whether Hatmaker's conduct constituted gross negligence under CJP § 5-604. We specifically noted that McCoy's widow conceded that the immunity provisions of CJP § 5-603 and CJP § 5-604 applied, absent a willful or grossly negligent act. McCoy, 135 Md.App. at 704-05, 763 A.2d 1233. As such, we did not address whether Hatmaker was employed by a fire or rescue company given his status as an employee of the city department responsible for responding to emergencies.

In Chase, 360 Md. at 123, 756 A.2d 987, the Court of Appeals held that CJP § 5-604 applied to municipal fire and rescue departments and their employees, as well as to volunteer fire and rescue companies and their employees. The Court of Appeals found that whether a fire or rescue company is public or private is irrelevant to CJP § 5-604's application, but did not define the term "rescue company." Id. To be sure, the Court stated there is no differentiation between public and private companies. Again, the threshold requirement is that the entity be a fire or rescue company. In Chase, the employer was the Baltimore City Fire Department. One of the petitioners was an emergency medical technician, a paramedic, employed by the Fire Department. Id. at 123, 756 A.2d 987. The Court of Appeals was not confronted with the question of whether or not the employer was a rescue company. As such, the Court was not required to explore the definition of the term "rescue company," and most certainly did not address the issue of whether a private commercial ambulance company is a rescue company. Under the circumstances of the cases, contrary to appellees' position, the proposition that private commercial ambulance companies are covered by CJP § 5-604 is not implicit in the Hatmaker and Chase opinions, nor do the opinions provide any guidance on the issue.

Appellee's argument that CJP § 5-604 is applicable because there was an emergency is without merit.26 Paramountly, the statute does not require the existence of an "emergency" as a prerequisite for its applicability. The clear language of the statute provides that for immunity, fire or rescue companies must not commit a willful or grossly negligent act and must be performing "their duties," which could include a vast number of activities outside of a rescue, emergency, or fire. See Kovatch Mobile Equip. Corp. v. Frederick County Maint. Dep't and Frederick County Bd. of Comm'rs, 62 Va. Cir. 52, 54, 2003 WL 21382434 (Va.Cir.Ct.2003) (applying Maryland law) (The Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke, Virginia held that "[m]odifications, alterations, maintenance, or otherwise, made on a fire truck's battery system, drive system, engine, or otherwise, are all clearly included within the potential duties of a fire department, particularly if a broad construction is applied [to CJP § 5-604]."). Given that the existence of an emergency is not a requirement of CJP § 5-604, to hold that appellees are immune under CJP § 5-604 would afford, for example, private commercial ambulance companies engaged in routine patient transfers such as transferring a patient from a hospital to a nursing home, immunity from civil liability under the Act. This would not be a salutary result.

Most conspicuously, however, it is evident from the record and the circumstances surrounding Bryson's intubation that appellees were not responding to a medical emergency. Bryson was electively intubated, by staff with knowledge that Easton Memorial was unable to care for Bryson once the procedure was completed and that Bryson would need to be transported to another facility. Bryson's condition prior to transport was not described in the record as one requiring emergency assistance. In the Complaint filed on February 6, 2009, appellants described the incident, in pertinent part, as follows:

According to appellant, a transport team arrived approximately four hours after Bryson was intubated, only after Easton contacted UMMS to determine if the hospital could take Bryson.

In this case, appellees and their employee, Barbour, were participating in a training opportunity as PHI Air Medical and employees from PHI Air Medical and UMMS transferred Bryson to UMMS. Barbour was a private commercial ambulance paramedic participating in Bryson's transfer for training purposes, unlike Hatmaker, who was a municipal employee of the city department dispatched to render emergency assistance. McCoy, 135 Md. App. at 701, 763 A.2d 1233. There was no genuine dispute of fact as to the nature of appellees' businesses—appellee TransCare Maryland, Inc. acknowledged being a licensed commercial ambulance company.

For all of the reasons set forth above, we conclude, based on a plain language analysis, the legislative history, and relevant case law and statutes, that a private commercial ambulance company is not, by definition, a fire or rescue company entitled to immunity under CJP § 5-604. We hold that appellee, TransCare Maryland, Inc., a private commercial ambulance company, is not a rescue company under CJP § 5-604 and, as such, appellees are not entitled to immunity under the Act.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED AS TO THE TRANSFER. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR TALBOT COUNTY REVERSED AS TO THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR TALBOT COUNTY FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEES.